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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to detect certain cyber attacks in a power distribution energy 
management system in a Smart Grid infrastructure. In the Smart Grid, signals are sent between the 
distribution operator and the customer on a real-time basis. Signals are used for automated energy 
management, protection and energy metering. This thesis aims at making use of various signals in 
the system to detect cyber attacks. The focus of the thesis is on a cyber attack that changes the 
parameters of the energy management system. The attacks considered change the set points, 
thresholds for energy management decisions, signal multipliers, and other digitally stored param-
eters that ultimately determine the transfer functions of the components. Since the distribution 
energy management system is assumed to be in a Smart Grid infrastructure, customer demand is 
elastic to the price of energy. The energy pricing is represented by a distribution locational mar-
ginal price. A closed loop control system is utilized as representative of the energy management 
system. Each element of the system is represented by a linear transfer function. Studies are done 
via simulations and these simulations are performed in Matlab SimuLink. The analytical calcula-
tions are done using Matlab.  
Signals from the system are used to obtain the frequency response of the component trans-
fer functions. The magnitude and phase angle of the transfer functions are obtained using the fast 
Fourier transform. The transfer function phase angles of base cases (no attack) are stored and are 
compared with the phase angles calculated at regular time intervals. If the difference in the phase 
characteristics is greater than a set threshold, an alarm is issued indicating the detection of a cyber 
attack.  
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The developed algorithm is designed for use in the envisioned Future Renewable Electric 
Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM) system. Examples are shown for the noise free and 
noisy cases. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ENERGY AND POWER MANAGEMENT IN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
1.1 Objectives of this Research 
The objective of this thesis is to detect cyber attacks in a closed loop distribution energy 
management system in a Smart Grid infrastructure. In the Smart Grid, signals are sent between the 
distribution operator and customer on a real-time basis. Also, signals are used for automated en-
ergy management, protection and energy metering. There are different possible reasons for wrong 
information to be fed back. The contents of this thesis focus on the detection of cyber attacks. 
These are the reasons for incorrect data to be sent to the distribution operator or the automated 
energy management system. Models are created in Matlab Simulink and the systems are analyzed 
in the s-domain. The proposed method utilizes a phase change detection property of energy man-
agement component transfer functions. 
1.2 The FREEDM System 
 The Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM) system was 
established by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2008. Objective of the FREEDM center 
is to develop innovative technology for the power industry, improving energy reliability and secu-
rity [1]. The universities participating in the FREEDM systems include North Carolina State Uni-
versity, Arizona State University, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, Missouri Uni-
versity of Science and Technology, ETH Zurich and Florida State University [2]. 
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 The envisioned FREEDM system aims at making changes to the contemporary power grid 
network. The basic concept is to replace the traditional 60 Hz transformers with solid state trans-
formers and the mechanical switches with solid state based protection devices [3]-[10]. 
 This thesis contributes to the FREEDM systems research by developing a method of de-
tecting cyber attack in a distribution energy management system in a Smart Grid infrastructure. 
1.3 Distribution Energy Management System in a Smart Grid Infrastructure 
The distribution energy management system in a Smart Grid infrastructure is represented 
in a closed loop control system structure. There are various elements in the system, which are all 
represented by control system blocks. Each of these elements and blocks is explained in the sec-
tions that follow. The transfer functions representing the blocks are chosen carefully and the whole 
system is designed such that, 
 the system in open loop state is stable i.e., the open loop transfer function of the system 
contains all the poles on the left half plane. 
 the system in closed loop state is stable i.e., the closed loop transfer function of the system 
contains all the poles on the left half plane. 
The schematic representation of the distribution energy management system in a Smart 
Grid infrastructure is shown in Figure (1.1). The concepts implemented are explained in the sec-
tions that follow. 
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Figure (1.1) Schematic of Distribution Energy Management System in a Smart Grid 
1.4 Linear Time Invariant Systems 
 The system in consideration in this thesis is a Linear Time Invariant (LTI) system. A sys-
tem is said to be an LTI system if the system’s output waveform is the same as long as the initial 
state and the input to the system are the same, irrespective of the time that they are applied at [11].  
 In order to make understanding better, the concept of linearity and time invariance are 
explained separately by the author in [12].  
 Linearity - Let )(1 tx  and )(2 tx  be any two signals. Let the output of a system to )(1 tx  be 
)(1 ty  and the output of the same system to )(2 tx  be )(2 ty . If, for an input of
)()( 2211 txtx   , the output of the system is )()( 2211 tyty   at all times, it implies that 
the system is linear. The foregoing definition assumes that 0)( ty when 0)( tx  If this is 
not the case, it is necessary to account for the component of )(ty due to input 0)( tx . 
 4 
 
 Time invariance – A system is said to be time invariant if, when )(ty  is the output for an 
input )(tx , then for any , )( ty  is the output for an input )( tx . 
When a system has both the properties mentioned above, it is said to be an LTI system. 
1.5 Frequency Domain Analysis of Control Systems 
 In practice, the performance of a feedback control system is preferably measured by its 
time domain response characteristics. In contrast, frequency response is of more importance in 
cases where the signals are mostly sinusoidal or periodic in nature. For this purpose, control system 
analysis and design are conducted in the frequency domain. This is used as a convenient vehicle 
towards the same objectives as with time domain methods [13]. Transfer function is used to char-
acterize an LTI system. In general, the relationship between input and output of a system is given 
by differential equations, when input and output are functions of time [14]. Studying systems using 
differential equations gets tougher as the systems get more complex. For this purpose, the differ-
ential equations are transformed into a convenient form by using the Laplace transform, a function 
of frequency [25]. Conversion of time domain function to the s-domain, )()( sFtf  , is given as, 
 



0
.)()( dtetfsF st  
 
(1.1) 
A generic feedback control system is shown in Figure (1.2). In s-domain, the input-output 
relation is described as, 
 
)()(1
)(
)(
)(
)(
sHsG
sG
sC
sR
sTCR

 . 
(1.2) 
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Figure (1.2) Simple Feedback System 
Under sinusoidal steady state, js  . On substituting, 
 
)()(1
)(
)(
)(
)(





jHjG
jG
jC
jR
jTCR

 . 
(1.3) 
Note that )( jTCR is a complex function of frequency, . Hence, CRT  can be expressed as a func-
tion of magnitude and phase angle, 
 )()()(  jTjTjT CRCRCR  . (1.4) 
Magnitude and phase angle plots are obtained when the magnitude and phase angles are plotted as 
a function of frequency, against frequency, .  
1.6 Need for Feedback Control 
A control system is an interconnection of subsystems consisting of sensor, controller and 
actuator. When the system operates in open loop, it is highly sensitive to uncertainty i.e., uncer-
tainty associated with desired outputs, disturbances and the system itself. To account for this un-
certainty, a closed loop system is used i.e., a feedback loop is implemented, which reduces the 
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sensitivity to a large extent. According to [16], feedback refers to the use of sensor provided infor-
mation by a controller for the purpose of decision making with the goal of achieving desirable 
closed loop characteristics. 
In this thesis, the system under consideration is that of a distribution energy management 
system which decides the load at the consumer side depending on the pricing signal from the dis-
tribution operator end. Since the price of energy does not remain constant, an open loop system 
may not function very well. For this purpose, a feedback control system is proposed, as shown in 
Figure (1.1). The feedback loop has a ‘Price modifier’ block, which uses the difference between 
the actual load on the consumer side and the load level set by the distribution operator to modify 
the signal going to the customer, thereby controlling customer load.  
1.7 The Demand-Price Relation 
Economic theory states that there is a negative relation between the demand for a particular 
commodity and its price. It states that the demand for electricity should decrease when there is a 
hike in price for an additional unit of energy. When it comes to electricity market, the relationship 
between energy demand and the price of energy is less elastic [17]. This is because the consumer 
does not have access to the price of energy on a real-time basis. Only at the end of each month the 
users get to know their consumption, in units of currency and energy.  
It is known that there can be energy saving of up to 20 percent if the customer are made 
known of the price that they are paying for electricity at any given point of time. One such method 
of achieving this is by making use of devices like In-Home Displays (IHD), where the consumers 
are provided with direct feedback of real-time energy consumption information, in units of energy 
and currency [18]. Another method is by making use of Automated Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 
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technology which uses an “agent-based model to demonstrate and quantify the economic impact 
of price elasticity of demand in electricity markets when consumers are well equipped with Smart 
Grid technologies to increase their awareness of responsiveness of demand” [19]. Research has 
been done in the field using Data Association Mining (DAM) algorithms which makes use of a 
multi-input multi-output forecasting engine to make price and demand predictions so that consum-
ers can react to electricity prices [20]. 
Studies have been conducted on the extent to which consumers respond to a variation in 
price [21]. It has been concluded that consumer behavior can be modeled using a matrix of self 
and cross elasticities to get to an overall approximate relation between the demand and price in a 
Smart Grid infrastructure. A typical elastic and inelastic relationship between demand and the price 
of electricity is depicted in Figure (1.3). 
 
Figure (1.3) Typical Elastic and Inelastic Demand-Price Relationship 
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Any one of the above mentioned techniques is used in a Smart Grid, making the relation-
ship between demand and price of electricity elastic. A suitable demand-price algebraic relation is 
used for studies in this work. For the sake of simplicity, demand is taken to have a linear relation-
ship with price.  The control block representing the demand-price relation is shown in Figure (1.4). 
 
Figure (1.4) Open Loop Control Structure of a Controlled Smart Grid Distribution System 
1.8 Integral Absolute Error 
A common and easy method of assessing the performance of a given system uses the Inte-
gral Square Error (ISE). ISE was suggested by James, Nichols and Philips [22]. For any input, a 
convenient integral function could be designed to obtain an index of performance. An example is 
the integral function of error. In [22], an RMS error function was given as, 
 

T
T
dtt
T
RMS
0
22 )(
1
lim  . 
 
(1.5) 
where )(t is the error value at any given time t. )(t is a generic error function such as the differ-
ence between a given output r(t) and the desired output rd(t). If the maximum permissible RMS 
error function is specified, a feedback control may be designed such that, 
 .maxRMSRMS   (1.6) 
 9 
 
This RMS error criterion has been used in many designs. The reason for its extensive use is its 
mathematical convenience and the fact that the method weighs the extent of undesirability of an 
error as the error increases. The ISE signal is used in control theory for the design of robust feed-
back controls.  
According to [23], the RMS error method is used to design various parameters of a control 
system such as component block gains, loop gains at a given frequency, and other component 
specific parameters. It is possible to do this for linear systems or nonlinear systems. Newton, Gould 
and Kaiser introduced this procedure to control engineering practice [24]. For step inputs, they 
used the ISE method, described below, and for statistical type inputs, they made use of the con-
ventional RMS error criterion. 
According to the authors of [25], an analytical method for the ISE criterion is much better 
than a numerical method. ISE is analytically formulated for linear continuous feedback control 
systems when the system is asymptotically stable in its closed loop and the error function is proper 
at all times. A typical feedback control system is shown in Figure (1.5).  
 
Figure (1.5) Typical Closed Loop Feedback Control System 
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In Figure (1.5), is the error value. The figure represents a simple feedback controller in 
which the time domain error function )(t is given by, 
 )()()()( tythtct  . (1.7) 
where c(t) is the input command and y(t) is the output. The notation (*) denotes convolution. The 
feedback gain is H(s) whose impulse response is given by h(t). The ISE function of the system is 
given by, 
 
.)(
0
2


 dttISE   
 
(1.8) 
An alternative index of performance for this particular case is the Integral Absolute Error (IAE), 
 



0
|)(| dttIAE  . 
 
(1.9) 
where )(t is a generic error function such as the difference between a given output r(t) and a de-
sired output rd(t).  
In (1.9), the absolute error at a given time, t, would be the absolute difference between the 
actual value of the output and the desired output value, if H(s) is unity. If )(t is an error power 
level (e.g., the difference between a desired load level and an actual load level), then the IAE is an 
error energy. 
1.9 Cybertampering  
Cybertampering refers to a disruption in accurate measurement of electricity usage by cus-
tomers. Feeding in false electricity usage data to the distribution operators by the customers in 
order to reduce their electricity bill is a type of cyber attack. There are a number of techniques 
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adopted by the customers to tamper the usage data that is fed back. In [26], the authors speak about 
various methods of energy theft, which are essentially methods of tampering with the electricity 
usage data that is fed back from the customer side. A comparative study of the extent of energy 
theft in 102 different countries was done for the years 1980 and 2000 by the author in [27]. It was 
seen that the extent of theft increased, resulting in higher electricity prices for the customers. This 
is turning out to be a critical issue where a part of the public is taking advantage of the innocent 
rest. This calls for better and effective methods of identifying energy theft in a system. Attempts 
have also been made to use distribution system state estimation to detect bad measurements from 
AMI real-time data [28]-[30]. The applications to distribution systems were limited due to the 
large number of state variables and small number of redundancies. 
The authors of [26] state that energy theft includes “using unregistered electrical appli-
ances, using alternate neutral lines, tampering with meters/terminals, sabotaging control wires, 
using magnets to decelerate the spinning discs for recording the energy consumption and tapping 
off of a neighbor.” The authors have addressed a mechanism to counter such tampering techniques. 
The mechanism proposed uses an online data validation framework, which checks if the measure-
ments from the home energy meters match with the measurements obtained from verification 
points at different levels in the system (feeder level, subsystem level, customer level). At the feeder 
level, the availability and integrity of the Feeder Remote Terminal Units (FRTU) is checked. This 
is achieved by analyzing the log information recorded by the FRTUs. An FRTU is deemed unre-
liable if malfunction events are observed from its log information.  
At the second level, a value called mismatch ratio is calculated for all the subsystems. It 
indicates the level of inconsistency of the metering data. These values are allotted by performing 
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power flow at the subsystem level. There are a few disadvantages of adopting this algorithm, which 
are discussed in detail in a section later. Once the faulty subsystem is identified, a pattern recog-
nition method is adopted to detect the customers that have been sending out faulty data. 
According to the U.S Department of Energy, one of the main qualities of a Smart Grid is 
that, any problem in the grid element should be identified, isolated and corrected with no human 
intervention [31], [32]. The process of treating itself has been termed self-healing. Basically, self-
healing is automation of power system control, monitoring and protection using advanced tech-
nology.  
Though it is unknown, as to, how far the self-healing Smart Grid can be achieved in reality, 
striving towards this goal is only going to make things better from the cyber security point of view 
[33]. Authors of [33] see the need to categorize the various elements in a Smart Grid infrastructure, 
into high risk, medium risk and low risk, depending on the level of risk the element’s failure would 
pose to the electrical grid. Control systems room and transmission are the only elements that pose 
high risk on failure. It is concluded in [33] that it is not only necessary to increase the security 
capabilities of the system, but it is also important to be able to independently validate the accuracy 
and reasonableness of commands from any distributed sensors. This is done by synthesizing the 
command from the distributed sensor and the control room operator and sending it forward to the 
next element only when the command signal is found to be genuine. 
1.10 Organization of this Thesis 
Chapter 1 has explained the fundamentals of the concepts that form the foundation of the 
work done in this thesis. The concepts include FREEDM system, distribution energy management 
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system, Smart Grid, price-demand relation, linearity, time invariance, cybersecurity, need for feed-
back control and integral absolute error as an index of performance. In Chapter 2, a test bed is 
designed to test the algorithm. The test bed is representative of a distribution energy management 
system. Each component in the test bed is explained and an appropriate transfer function is as-
signed to represent each of the components. Once the test bed is explained in detail, the algorithm 
developed to detect cyber attacks is explained. 
Chapters 3 and 4 involve results of simulations conducted to test the validity of the algo-
rithm developed. Chapter 3 deals with a noise free environment, whereas Chapter 4 has simulation 
results of the test bed in a noisy environment. Chapter 5 makes conclusions about the study done 
in this thesis and there are some recommendations on possible future work in the same field. The 
Appendix section contains Matlab codes that are used to implement the algorithm developed in 
this work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CYBER ATTACKS DETECTION IN POWER DISTRI-
BUTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
2.1 Model of a Distribution Energy Management System 
 The system under consideration in this thesis is assumed to be in a Smart Grid infrastruc-
ture. The main features adopted are: 
 A pricing signal, called Distribution Locational Marginal Price (DLMP), is used as the 
control signal to control the demand level at the customer end.  
 Signals are constantly fed back to the automated energy management system. 
 Customer demand is elastic to variations in the DLMP signal. 
A schematic representation of the system is shown in Figure (1.1). A test bed is created for 
testing and running simulations. It is shown in Figure (2.1). Each block represented in the test bed 
(P, Q, Q’, R, S, T) will be explained in the upcoming sections. 
 
Figure (2.1) Schematic of Test Bed Created to Study a Distribution Energy Management System 
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Each node in a system has its own LMP, which is essentially the price of an additional unit 
of energy. In [36], LMP is defined as “the marginal cost supplying, at least, the next increment of 
electric demand at a specific location (node) on the electric power network, taking into account 
both supply (generation/import) bids and demand (load/export) offers and the physical aspects of 
the transmission system including transmission and other operational constraints.” A lot of re-
search has been done in the field of LMPs and their importance [37]-[39]. 
However, LMP would not be sufficient for the control of loads in the Smart Grid. Methods 
were developed to set something called a spot price [40]. The concept of spot pricing was viewed 
to be different from conventional pricing and control methods. The authors of [40] feel that the 
customer should be penalized for contributing to the system peak, not for their own peak. Spot 
pricing takes both, supply and demand factors, into consideration. 
 The concept of LMP was modified at the distribution level for use in the Smart Grid appli-
cations. This was termed as the Distribution Locational Marginal Price (DLMP) signal. A number 
of formulations of this pricing signal have been done [41]. According to the authors of [42] the 
DLMP is a much more accurate pricing of an additional unit of energy at the distribution level. 
The reason given was that DLMP includes Marginal Energy Cost (MEC), Marginal Loss Cost 
(MLC) and Marginal Congestion Cost (MCC). 
 Further, the existing flat-rate retail system, defined by LMP at the nodes, causes market 
inefficiency [43]. Various techniques were developed for the calculation of LMP in distribution 
systems (e.g., a distribution LMP or DLMP), one of which was the use of quadratic programming 
and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker method [44]. Another method takes into consideration demand re-
sponse to calculate DLMP [45]. The cited method involves using LMP as the starting point for the 
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formulation of the DLMP. Price responsive load Optimal Power Flow (OPF) was used to build the 
constraints and solve for the DLMP. 
 In the tests conducted, the input price signal to the system is assumed to be the DLMP at 
the particular customer service entrance. Since, this thesis deals with systems at the distribution 
level, representation of the input pricing signal as a DLMP signal would be appropriate. The cus-
tomer in the test bed is assumed to be a residential customer. The DLMP signal could take values 
in the range of 0.01 $/kWh – 0.25 $/kWh. For testing purposes in this thesis, the change in DLMP 
is represented as a step input )(tku of amplitude k plus a sinusoidal input of amplitude 005.0 and 
frequency 1.0 rad/s. In some tests, noise is added to simulate the usual variation of DLMP with 
time. This particular test signal is used to excite dynamics in the energy management system and 
to obtain an output signal (i.e., the controlled load) that is suitable for signal analysis. 
2.3 Demand-Price Relation 
 The demand-price relation, in the case of electricity, is pretty inelastic. This is because the 
customers are not aware of the price being paid for a unit of energy in real time. In a Smart Grid 
infrastructure, customers are made aware of the real time pricing of electricity through Smart Me-
ters, AMI technology and DAM algorithms. It could be concluded that consumer behavior can be 
modeled to get to an overall approximate relation between the demand and price in a Smart Grid 
infrastructure. Real-time pricing and billing monitors consumption in real time and bills immedi-
ately, giving consumers flexibility to track and pay for usage. 
 For testing purposes, demand is taken to be elastic to changes in input DLMP. For conven-
ience the relation is considered to be linear. The demand (D) for a price level (P) is given by, 
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10 . 
(2.1) 
where the price (P) is in $/kWh and demand (D) is in kW. Such a relation allows price to vary 
from 0 $/kWh to 0.30 $/kWh, although the DLMP pricing signal is taken to vary anywhere be-
tween 0.01 $/kWh and 0.25 $/kWh. The graphical representation of (2.1) is given in Figure (2.2). 
 
Figure (2.2) Demand-Price Relation Used in the Tests 
2.4 System and Sensor Dynamics 
 The blocks System dynamics and Sensor dynamics in the test bed represent the fact that a 
system does not respond immediately to a given signal. The system takes its time to settle at the 
final state once it receives the signal. The signal that the test bed receives is that of a pricing signal. 
When price per unit of electricity changes, the system takes its time to settle at modified demand 
level. This is due to the System dynamics block. This block is designed in such a way that the 
system is very slow. This calls for a feedback loop, which makes the system comparatively faster. 
The comparison between open loop system and the closed loop system is done in one of following 
sections. Similarly, the Sensor dynamics block is used to represent the time delay associated with 
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the sensor signals. Signals detected by the sensor are not transmitted immediately. The sensor is 
taken to be faster than the system in its open loop. Both the blocks are represented by transfer 
functions in the test bed. The transfer functions used are, 
 
System dynamics
04.0
04.0


s
 
(2.2) 
 
Sensor dynamics
10
10


s
. 
(2.3) 
These transfer functions are represented as “typical,” but it is noted that if other transfer functions 
are used, the subsequent analysis procedure is still valid. 
2.5 Test Bed 
 The different properties and blocks used in the test bed have been explained in Sections 
2.1 – 2.4. The test bed is designed in SimuLink and is shown in Figure (2.3). 
 
Figure (2.3) Energy Management Control System Test Bed Used in All Noise Free Test Cases 
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2.6 Price Modifier Block 
 As explained in Section 2.4, a feedback loop is used to make the system faster i.e., respond 
faster to changes in input signal. The actual demand at a given instant, t, is compared with the 
reference demand signal and the error is fed back through a Price modifier block. The function of 
the Price modifier block is to make the demand settle at the corresponding value faster. Price 
modifier block is represented by a transfer function, given as, 
 
Price modifier .
3011
)03.0)(30(
2 

ss
 
(2.4) 
To illustrate the effect of having a feedback loop modifying certain control signals (e.g., 
the signal e(t) shown in Figure (2.3)), an example is shown. Initially the test bed has been func-
tioning with an input price of 0.10 $/kWh. Correspondingly, the demand is at 6.667 kW. The price 
signal is now modified to 0.20 $/kWh and the response of the system in its open loop and closed 
loop are observed. The difference in system response is shown in Figure (2.4). Note that the inte-
gral of the demand power is energy. And therefore the area between the two curves shown in 
Figure (2.4) is the energy difference. In the example shown, the energy difference with and without 
feedback is approximately 112 kJ. 
The DC gain of the Price modifier block is 0.03, which essentially means that in the steady 
state, there is a change of 0.03 $/kWh in the signal e(t) for a difference of 1 kW between the actual 
demand and the reference demand.  
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Figure (2.4) Comparison of Response (Controlled Load) of the Test Bed System in Open Loop 
and Closed Loop Configurations 
2.7 Frequency Response Analysis 
 Signals from different points in the system are sent to the automated energy management 
system on a real-time basis. These signals can be used to check if the system has been compro-
mised by performing Frequency Response Analysis (FRA). With all FRA techniques, one of the 
main limitations has been the lack of an objective to compare two different transfer functions. 
Different methodologies have been adopted in the past as an evaluating parameter. In [43], the 
authors evaluated the difference between two transfer functions by defining Weighted Normalized 
Difference (WND). Other evaluating parameters have also been used in the past [44]-[46]. In the 
tests conducted, the phase angles of the transfer functions will be compared with base case phase 
angles. 
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2.8 Transfer Function Estimation 
The transfer function is obtained from the numerical signal values from the sensors in the 
system. The frequency response of the transfer function between two given points, A and B, can 
be obtained by performing Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). Note that A is the input signal and B is 
the output signal. Dividing the FFT of B array by the FFT of A array, term by term, gives the 
frequency response of the transfer function between A and B. To make understanding of this 
method better, a simple schematic representation is shown in Figure (2.5). This algorithm is im-
plemented in Matlab where the term by term division is denoted by “./” 
 
Figure (2.5) Example for Transfer Function Estimation Using the FFT 
A and B are signals in time-domain, calculated at regular intervals, and are stored in an 
array of length N. The signals are sampled a regular time intervals of t . The transfer function 
between the points A and B is given by )(sH . The arrays NA 1 and NB 1 are represented in (2.5) and 
(2.6), 
  NNkN AAAAAA 1211 ......    (2.5) 
  NNkN BBBBBB 1211 ......   . (2.6) 
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The magnitude and phase angle plots of the transfer function, )( jH , is found by performing 
(2.7)-(2.11), 
 )(_ 11 NN AfftAFFT    (2.7) 
 )(_ 11 NN BfftBFFT    (2.8) 
 
k
kN
k
AFFT
BFFT
H
_
_
1  . 
(2.9) 
On performing (2.7)-(2.9), an array of complex numbers is obtained, which is essentially 
the representation of the transfer function in rectangular coordinates. Array H is then converted to 
polar form by finding the magnitude and phase angles separately, 
 
k
N
k HmagH 1_  (2.10) 
 
k
N
k HphaseH 1_ . (2.11) 
When arrays NmagH 1_ and NphaseH 1_ are plotted against frequency, magnitude and phase an-
gle plots of transfer function, )( jH , are obtained. 
2.9 Defining the threshold Matrix for Cyber Attack Detection 
The algorithm developed to detect cyber attacks in a distribution energy management system 
is briefly given as: 
Step 1 – A base case of the distribution system test bed is created. Magnitude and phase 
angle plots of the transfer functions between different sets of points in the system 
(for e.g., c and r, c and b, in Figure (2.1)) are found using the method explained in 
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Section 2.8. These plots are the base case plots, with which plots will be compared 
at regular intervals, to check for cyber attack or failure in the system. 
Step 2 – Acceptable limits of change are set for each block in the system. This will define 
the changes in the system up to which the system can tolerate, without issuing an 
alarm. With each of these changes in the blocks, one at a time, the phase angle plots 
of the transfer functions between the different sets of points are obtained.  
Step 3 – For each type of change in system block, phase angle plots are compared with that 
of base case transfer functions that were created and stored earlier, as in Step 1. The 
maximum change in phase angle plots are saved in an array. This is done for all 
types of acceptable changes in the system blocks and a threshold matrix is formed. 
The transfer functions monitored are, 
qpTF  - Transfer function between p and q 
where p is the input and q is the output. See Figure (2.1). Note that the qp, pairs used are ac, ,
 rc, , bc, , dc, , br, and .,de  
The base case is taken to be the case when the blocks are all as shown in Figure (2.3) and 
DLMP input price signal is 0.15 $/kWh. The system, at any point, is compared with this case for 
any cyber attacks in the distribution energy management system. The calculated transfer functions 
(e.g., )( jH calc ) are then examined in the frequency domain to obtain the phase of )( jH calc . 
These phase characteristics are then compared to the base case phase characteristics, )( jHbase . 
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If a difference is detected between )( jH calc and )( jHbase , then one may suspect a cyber 
attack. The maximum values of, 
 )()(  jHjH basecalc   (2.12) 
are shown in Table (2.1) for the indicated six transfer functions. Note that entries in this table are 
not all zero because changes in the input DLMP impacts . For example, if the base case of 0.15 
$/kWh changes to 0.1 $/kWh, a phase difference, 405.2  degree results for acTF  . Since the 
input DLMP price signal can vary from 0.01 $/kWh to a maximum of 0.25 $/kWh, there should 
be an alarm only when the price exceeds 0.25 $/kWh. Hence, the threshold for changes in block P 
is set to take the values corresponding to the phase angle differences when the price is 0.25 $/kWh. 
The frequencies at which the maximum angle differences occur are also noted. The reso-
lution of frequency step in the tests is
100

 rad/s. A better estimate of frequency at which 
maximum phase angle difference occurs could be obtained by varying the time step appropriately. 
The time step denotes the time interval after which the subsequent signal is recorded from the test 
bed. The time step used in the tests is 01.0t second. Parameters in the various transfer functions 
are changed to calculate threshold values for detection of cyber attacks. Each of the blocks (Q, Q’, 
R, S, T) is increased/decreased by 5%, keeping the DC gain of the transfer function constant, and 
the maximum differences in phase angle values of all transfer functions are noted. For example, 
the transfer function of block S, as shown in (2.13) is modified by +5% to (2.14), 
 
10
10
)(


s
sH S  
(2.13) 
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(2.14) 
Numerator and trailing terms of the denominator are multiplied by 1.05 because the gain 
of the transfer function has to be constant at steady state. If only one of the terms were changed, 
the DC gain of the transfer function would be modified. At least in theory, a change in DC gain 
would be readily detected. In order to identify minor changes in the system, thresholds on phase 
angle differences are set based on changes that do not change the DC gain of the transfer function. 
The maximum phase angle differences for the changes denoted are displayed in Table (2.2). The 
frequencies at which the maximum phase angle differences occur are also specified in the table. 
  
 
2
6
 
Table (2.1) Phase Angle Differences in Transfer Functions for Changes in DLMP Input 
 
Input DLMP price  
signal ‘P’ ($/kWh) 
Maximum difference in phase angle (in degrees) of indicated transfer functions 
Frequency at which this maximum phase angle difference occurs (rad/s) 
acTF   rcTF   bcTF   dcTF   brTF   deTF   
0.01 4.9201 at 
5978.12  
0.0374 at 
0106.2  
0.0347 at 
0106.2  
3.1242 at 
1164.16  
0.0027 at 
0106.2  
3.1507 at 
0535.16  
0.05 3.9891 at 
2522.12  
0.031 at 
0106.2  
0.0287 at  
0106.2  
2.5384 at 
8022.15  
0.0022 at 
0106.2  
2.5608 at 
708.15  
0.1 2.405 at 
7181.11  
0.0194 at 
0106.2  
0.018 at
0106.2  
1.5349 at
2681.15  
0.0014 at
0106.2  
1.5495 at
1739.15  
0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2 4.1877 at
8960.9  
0.0387 at
0106.2  
0.0359 at
0106.2  
2.6897 at
3518.13  
0.0028 at
0106.2  
2.7241 at
2261.13  
0.25 14.0551 at
8540.7  
0.1547 at 
0106.2  
0.1436 at
0106.2  
9.0013 at
0898.11  
0.0111 at
0106.2  
9.1759 at 
9642.10  
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Table (2.2) Phase Angle Differences in Transfer Functions for Changes in Blocks Q, Q’, R, S, T 
Type of 
change in the 
system 
Maximum difference in phase angle (in degrees) of transfer functions 
Frequency at which this maximum phase angle difference occurs (rad/s) 
acTF   rcTF   bcTF   dcTF   brTF   deTF   
 
,Q  
'Q  
+5% 0.7091 at 
7128.10  
0.0295 at 
0106.2  
0.0223 at 
0106.2  
0.6046 at 
2000.14  
0.0079 at 
7960.2  
0.6104 at 
1372.14  
-5% 0.6610 at 
0898.11  
0.0305 at 
0106.2  
0.0233 at 
0106.2  
0.5677 at 
7341.14  
0.0080 at 
7646.2  
0.5727 at 
7027.14  
 
R  
+5% 0.0930 at 
0106.2  
0.0934 at 
0106.2  
0.0835 at 
0106.2  
0.0882 at 
0106.2  
0.0113 at 
2044.3  
0.0046 at 
9597.21  
-5% 0.0929 at 
0106.2  
0.0933 at 
0106.2  
0.0834 at 
0106.2  
0.0880 at 
0106.2  
0.0113 at 
2044.2  
0.0045 at 
9597.21  
 
S  
+5% 0.0141 at 
8903.2  
0.0001 at 
3929.3  
0.0132 at 
8903.2  
0.0140 at 
9531.2  
0.0132 at 
8588.2  
0.0019 at 
4881.15  
-5% 0.0157 at 
8274.2  
0.0001 at 
3301.3  
0.0148 at 
8274.2  
0.0156 at 
8903.2  
0.0147 at 
7960.2  
0.0022 at 
3938.15  
 
T  
+5% 2.0643 at 
3929.3  
0.0299 at 
1049.2  
0.0309 at 
0106.2  
1.9481 at 
2987.3  
0.0061 at 
6181.4  
1.9295 at 
3615.3  
-5% 2.1487 at 
2358.3  
0.0326 at 
0106.2  
0.0334 at 
0106.2  
 
2.0246 at 
1416.3  
0.0063 at 
4611.4  
2.0040 at 
2044.3  
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With reference to Table (2.2), the phase angle difference value lesser in magnitude out of the +5% 
and -5% changes is chosen as a threshold. This is done to detect a cyber attack. If the cited thresh-
old is set too large, one may incur a false dismissal. This is a term applied when a faulty condition 
is dismissed as normal. On the other hand, setting a lower value of threshold could cause a false 
alarm. A false alarm is the term given to an alarm caused by a normally functioning system. The 
threshold matrix is found to be, 
 

















9295.10061.09481.10309.00299.00643.2
0019.00132.00140.00132.00001.00141.0
0045.00113.00880.00834.00933.00929.0
5727.00079.05677.00223.00295.06610.0
1759.90111.00013.91436.01547.00551.14
threshold . 
 
 
(2.15) 
The foregoing example is presented as an illustration. For other energy management sys-
tems, the data shown in (2.15) may be different, but the selection of thresholds and calculation 
procedure will be the same. The only constraint is that the energy management system should be 
linear and time invariant. 
2.10 Cyber Attack Detection Using threshold Matrix 
 Once the threshold matrix is formed as explained in Section 2.9, cyber attacks in the energy 
management system can be identified. Signals are obtained from the points (a, b, c, d, e, r) by the 
central distribution control center on a timely basis. The transfer function magnitude and phase 
plots are obtained using the methods explained, and the phase angle plots are compared with the 
phase angle plots of the base case transfer functions. On comparing the transfer function phase 
angle plot values, the maximum phase angle differences for all the transfer functions are stored in 
an array, max_ang_diff, 
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(2.16) 
In (2.16) the maxima shown in the vector on the right hand side represents the maxima over fre-
quency, . This array 61_max_ diffang is compared with each row of the threshold matrix. If each 
element of the array 61_max_ diffang is greater than the corresponding column element in at least 
one row of the threshold matrix, an alarm is issued. To make this method easier, a flag matrix,
is defined. The matrix is of the same dimension as the threshold matrix. Matrix is initialized 
to, 
 

















000000
000000
000000
000000
000000
. 
 
 
(2.17) 
As the diffang_max_ array is compared with each row of threshold matrix, is updated. If an 
element in the diffang_max_ array is greater than the corresponding column element in any of 
the rows in threshold matrix, set the flag element in corresponding to the coordinates in threshold 
matrix, to 1. The process is better explained in the flowchart in Figure (2.6). 
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Figure (2.6) Flowchart Explaining flag Matrix Modification 
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Once is updated, sum of each element in a row is calculated for each row of . If the row 
sum is 6, there has been a cyber attack on the system. Mathematically, row sum vector, , is cal-
culated as, 
 





















1
1
1
1
1
1
 . 
 
 
(2.18) 
If any of the elements of is six, it means there has been a cyber attack on the system. Note 
that the alarm triggering value in the vector depends on the number of different transfer functions 
being observed in the system. Since there are six transfer functions being observed in the artifact 
test bed, the triggering value is six. If there are n transfer functions being observed in a system, an 
alarm is issued if at least one of the elements of turns out to be n. 
2.11 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter explains the following in detail: 
 Schematic of the closed loop control system used for tests. 
 Components of the test bed (i.e., DLMP input pricing signal, system and sensor dynamics, 
demand-price relation and price modifying block). 
 Algorithm developed to detect cyber attacks in the distribution energy management system 
by making use of the FFT. 
 Defining and obtaining the threshold matrix for the test bed. 
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 Introducing flag matrix, , and row sum matrix, , to check for a cyber attack in the system 
at regular intervals. In case of a cyber attack, an alarm is issued. 
The next chapter will illustrate cyber attack detection using the developed algorithm. This is done 
with a test bed based on the FREEDM distribution system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS FOR GENERATING ALARMS: THE NOISE FREE 
CASE 
3.1 Introduction to Test Cases 
The preceding chapters explained the schematic of the test bed used to illustrate the algo-
rithm developed to detect cyber attacks in a distribution energy management system. The various 
blocks in the test bed are all represented as transfer function blocks. Reasons for the selection of 
the values chosen for the transfer functions have also been explained. Finally, the algorithm de-
veloped to detect cyber attacks was explained in detail in Chapter 2. This section will contain 
illustrations of cyber attacks on the test bed and the validity of the algorithm will be tested. 
This chapter deals with an ideal situation i.e., a noise free environment in the system. This 
means that the numerical signals obtained from different nodes in the system as a function of time 
are, in fact, the accurate signal values without any error. This might not be a very realistic repre-
sentation of systems in the real world. To make understanding easier, first the noise free ideal 
system will be tested with the algorithm in this chapter. Chapter 4 will deal with the noisy case. 
3.2 Types of Tests 
There are a number of locations in the test bed at which a cyber attack could occur. The 
list of locations is given in Table (3.1). Since the locations are all transfer function blocks, a cyber 
attack is illustrated by changing the values of a transfer function block compared to a base case. 
This way, a number of cyber attacks are illustrated by making different permutation and combina-
tion of changes in the blocks. A few examples will be explained and shown in this chapter. 
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Once a change is depicted in the system, phase plots of the transfer functions between 
different points in the system are compared with the base case transfer function phase angle plots. 
As explained in Sections 2.8 – 2.10, the maximum phase angle differences are observed and are 
compared with the rows of the threshold matrix. Finally the row sum matrix is created to check for 
any cyber attacks in the system.  
Table (3.1) List of Cyber Attack Locations 
Cyber attack  
location 
Intention of test Nominal (base) value 
 
P 
Test illustrates impact of a cyber attack on the 
DLMP pricing signal reported at a point of end 
case. 
 
0.15 $/kWh 
 
Q, Q’ 
Test illustrates the impact of cyber attack on the 
elasticity and customer demand response to 
price. 
 
3
100
 
R Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on system 
dynamics. 
04.0
04.0
s
 
S Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on sensor 
dynamics. 
10
10
s
 
T Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on the price 
controller block in the system. 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
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The following are the cases that are shown in the upcoming sections, 
 Case 1 – Change in DLMP pricing signal, represented by P, from 0.15 $/kWh to 0.25 
$/kWh. 
 Case 2 – Change in blocks Q and Q’ from 
3
100
 to 
3
95
. 
 Case 3 – Change in block R from 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
042.0
042.0
s
. 
 Case 4 – Change in block S from 
10
10
s
to 
51.10
51.10
s
. 
 Case 5 – Change in block T from 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
to 
51.2811
)03.0)(51.28(
2  ss
. 
All the test cases will use the threshold matrix as formed in Section 2.9, 
 

















9295.10061.09481.10309.00299.00643.2
0019.00132.00140.00132.00001.00141.0
0045.00113.00880.00834.00933.00929.0
5727.00079.05677.00223.00295.06610.0
1759.90111.00013.91436.01547.00551.14
threshold . 
 
 
(3.1) 
3.3 Case 1 – Change in P Block 
In Case 1, consider a change in P: 0.15 $/kWh to 0.25 $/kWh. According to the threshold 
values set, this change should not issue an alarm. On making the changes and running the simula-
tion on SimuLink and checking for a cyber attack, the following key observations are made, 
  1759.90111.00013.91436.01547.00551.14_max_ diffang  (3.2) 
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
















111111
101111
101111
111111
000000
 
 
(3.3) 
 

















6
5
5
6
0
 . 
 
(3.4) 
In (3.2), the maxima are in degrees. These results suggest that there is a cyber attack in the system, 
where there is not. This is one of the situations where an alarm is issued by the automated energy 
management system during a normal condition, called a false alarm. Upon further inspection the 
alarm will be ruled of as a normal condition. This is a disadvantage of using the algorithm devel-
oped. On trial and error, it was found that the algorithm works fine till a DLMP pricing signal of 
0.2286 $/kWh. For any input signal greater than 0.2286 $/kWh, a false alarm is issued.  
3.4 Case 2 – Change in Blocks Q and Q’ 
In Case 2, consider a change in Q and Q' : 
3
100
to 
3
95
. According to the threshold values 
set, this change should not issue an alarm. On making the changes and running the simulation on 
SimuLink and checking for a cyber attack, the following key observations are made, 
  5727.00080.05677.00233.00305.06610.0_max_ diffang  (3.5) 
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
















010010
101111
101001
010110
000000
 
 
(3.6) 
 

















2
5
3
3
0
 . 
 
(3.7) 
In all cases, the maximum phase angle difference values (e.g., (3.5)) are in degrees. These results 
suggest that there is no cyber attack in the system, which agrees with the values put in. To further 
check the validity of the algorithm, another change is made to the block and the matrices are 
checked, i.e., change in Q and Q' : 
3
100
to 
3
9.94
. This should issue an alarm as the change is more 
than 5%. The algorithm gives the following results, 
  5838.00081.05787.00238.00312.06737.0_max_ diffang  (3.8) 
 

















010010
101111
101001
111111
000000
 
 
(3.9) 
 

















2
5
3
6
0
 . 
 
(3.10) 
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An alarm is issued as at least one of the values in the matrix row sum is 6. This further validates 
the algorithm’s functionality. 
3.5 Case 3 – Change in Block R 
In Case 3, consider a change in R : 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
42.0
042.0
s
. This is a 5% change in the block 
and shouldn’t trigger an alarm. The key matrices obtained on running the algorithm are, 
  0046.00113.00882.00835.00934.00930.0_max_ diffang  (3.11) 
 

















010110
101111
101111
010110
010000
 
 
(3.12) 
 

















3
5
5
3
1
 . 
 
(3.13) 
Below a change of +5% in block R an alarm is not issued. The terminology used here is that a +5% 
“change in a block” refers to the simultaneous change in numerator and pole value. A negative 
change in the block is checked too. It appears that the algorithm does not indicate a cyber attack 
up to a -5% change in the block. It means that there are no false alarms for changes in R in the test 
bed. 
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 On the other hand, if the change is over 5%, the automated energy management system 
should issue an alarm. Such a case is simulated and the output of the algorithm is observed, change 
in R : 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
379.0
0379.0
s
. Following results are observed due to the change mentioned above, 
  0047.00119.00924.00876.00979.00975.0_max_ diffang  (3.14) 
 

















010110
101111
111111
010110
010000
 
 
(3.15) 
 

















3
5
6
3
1
 . 
 
(3.16) 
This is an indication that there are no false dismissals.  
3.6 Case 4 – Change in Block S 
In Case 4, consider a change in S : 
10
10
s
 to 
51.10
51.10
s
. This is a change of 5.1% to block 
S. Since the threshold values are from changes of 5%, this change should trigger an alarm. Simu-
lation is run after the change is made to the system in SimuLink. The matrices obtained are given 
below, 
  002.00134.00142.00135.00001.00143.0_max_ diffang  (3.17) 
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
















010000
111111
010000
010000
010000
 
 
(3.18) 
 

















1
6
1
1
1
 . 
 
(3.19) 
While this proves that there are no cases of false dismissals, another case shows that there are 
situations where false alarms are issued. A false alarm is issued when there is a reduction in the 
block in the range of 4.51% to 5%. 
3.7 Case 5 – Change in Block T 
In Case 5, consider a change in T : 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
 to 
51.2811
)03.0)(51.28(
2  ss
. When the specified 
change occurs, the automated energy management system operator should see it as a normal con-
dition, since the change is less than 5%. Once again, the terminology used here for “a 5% change 
in a block” refers to a simultaneous 5% change in numerator and trailing denominator parameter. 
Thus a “5% change” does not affect the DC gain of the block. In this particular example, the 5% 
change is manifested as 50.2830  in the numerator and 50.2830  change in the trailing de-
nominator term. In this particular test, the indicated change is less than 5%, and thus the parameter 
28.51 is used (representing a change of 4.966%). The change is simulated in SimuLink and the 
algorithm responds in the following way, 
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  9904.10063.00108.20332.00324.01341.2_max_ diffang  (3.20) 
 

















111111
101111
101001
101111
000000
 
 
(3.21) 
 

















6
5
3
5
0
 . 
 
(3.22) 
This is a case of false alarm. On further inspection, the system is found to be functioning in normal 
condition. By simulating other changes, it is found that there are no cases of false dismissals en-
countered for changes in block T.  
3.8 Summary of Cases of False Dismissals and False Alarms 
 From the tests conducted, it can be concluded that there are a few cases of false alarms, 
although there are no false dismissals. This is a conservative design – i.e., no false dismissals, but 
there may be false alarms. The algorithm performance detecting cyber attack in the test bed is 
summarized in Table (3.2). 
Chapter 4 will address the case where noise is present in the system. The types of noise 
encountered in a distribution energy management system will be addressed and the algorithm will 
be tested in a noisy test bed.  
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Table (3.2) Performance of Algorithm for Cyber Attacks in Various Locations in a Noise-free 
Case 
Case  
number 
Type of change in  
system 
False alarm False  
dismissal 
Case 1 Change in P  
(base case 0.15 $/kWh) 
25.02286.0  P  None 
 
Case 2 
Change in Q and Q’ :
3
)1(100 Q
 
Base case 0Q  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 3 
Change in R: 
)1(04.0
)1(04.0
Rs
R


 
Base case 0R  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 4 
Change in S :
)1(10
)1(10
Ss
S


 
Base case 0S  
 
%5%5.4  S  
 
None 
 
Case 5 
Change in T :
)1(3011
)1)(03.0)(30(
2 Tss
T


 
Base case 0T  
 
%5%83.4  T  
 
None 
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CHAPTER 4 
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS FOR GENERATING ALARMS: THE NOISY CASE 
4.1 Introduction to Noisy Test Cases 
 This chapter contains illustrations of cyber attacks on the test bed where the input DLMP 
signal varies with time. The DLMP signal is contaminated with noise for these tests. In the test 
cases conducted in SimuLink, noise in the DLMP signal is represented by a random number block. 
The random number parameters are set depending on the magnitude of signal variation. A signal 
to noise ratio of 50 is used in the tests conducted. The addition of noise is as shown, 
 
Figure (4.1) Energy Management Control System Test Bed in Noisy Test Cases 
 On making changes to the input signal to the system, all signal values change and, hence, 
the important threshold matrix is modified too. The new threshold matrix for the noisy case is 
derived in Section 4.2. 
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4.2 Threshold Matrix for Noisy Cases 
 As mentioned in earlier sections, the threshold matrix changes when there is any change at 
the input end. The procedure followed to obtain the threshold matrix is same as explained in Sec-
tion 2.9. Although, it is observed that the phase angle of the transfer function between any two 
points in the system varies anywhere between -180 and 180 degrees at different frequencies. For 
this reason, the phase angle differences in all the transfer functions above 20 degrees are ignored. 
They are assumed to be caused by the noise signal at the input. Following the steps explained in 
detail in Section 2.9, the threshold matrix for the noisy case is found as, 
 

















9362.10064.09534.10313.00305.08161.13
0040.00142.00140.00143.00001.01473.0
0072.00122.00880.00811.00906.00967.0
3002.20106.06484.10257.00333.0048.15
9869.190850.08268.192362.02593.08592.19
threshold . 
 
 
(4.1) 
4.3 Type of Tests 
 Since the test bed created is the same as in the noise free case, the locations where a cyber 
attack could occur are the same as in Chapter 3. The list of cyber attack locations is given in Table 
(4.1). 
The following are the cases that are shown in the upcoming sections, 
 Case 1 – Change in DLMP pricing signal, represented by P, from 0.15 $/kWh to 0.25 
$/kWh. 
 Case 2 – Change in blocks Q and Q’ from 
3
100
 to 
3
95
. 
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 Case 3 – Change in block R from 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
042.0
042.0
s
. 
 Case 4 – Change in block S from 
10
10
s
to 
51.10
51.10
s
. 
 Case 5 – Change in block T from 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
to 
51.2811
)03.0)(51.28(
2  ss
. 
Table (4.1) List of Cyber Attack Locations 
Cyber attack  
location 
Intention of test Nominal (base) value 
 
P 
Test illustrates impact of a cyber attack on the 
DLMP pricing signal reported at a point of end 
case. 
 
0.15 $/kWh 
 
Q, Q’ 
Test illustrates the impact of cyber attack on the 
elasticity and customer demand response to 
price. 
 
3
100
 
R Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on system 
dynamics. 
04.0
04.0
s
 
S Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on sensor 
dynamics. 
10
10
s
 
T Illustrates the impact of cyber attack on the price 
controller block in the system. 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
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A “base case” is simulated and the phase angle values are stored for all the transfer functions. 
The test case will be simulated and the phase angle plots of the transfer functions will be compared 
with that of the base case. In the upcoming sections, different cyber attacks are simulated and the 
following are displayed for each case: 
 An array, max_ang_diff, containing the maximum phase angle differences, in degrees, ob-
served in each transfer function phase characteristics. 
 Flag matrix, , depicting the locations of violations in the threshold matrix. 
 Vector row sum, , indicating if a cyber attack has been detected or not. 
Also, “an n% change in a block” refers to a simultaneous n% change in numerator and trailing 
denominator parameter. 
4.4 Case 1 – Change in P Block 
In Case 1, consider a change in P: 0.15 $/kWh to 0.25 $/kWh. According to the threshold 
values set, this change should not issue an alarm. On making the changes and running the simula-
tion on SimuLink and checking for a cyber attack, the following key observations are made, 
  9869.190850.08268.192362.02593.08592.19_max_ diffang  (4.2) 
 

















111111
111111
111111
111111
000000
flag  
 
(4.3) 
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
















6
6
6
6
0
 . 
 
(4.4) 
The row sum matrix indicates the existence of a cyber attack, when there is none. This is a case of 
false alarm. On simulation of more cases, it is observed that a relatively small change in the input 
DLMP signal causes a false alarm. Any pricing signal above 0.1806 $/kWh causes a false alarm. 
This is solely due to the presence of a noise component as this is not the case with that of the noise 
free tests. 
4.5 Case 2 – Change in Blocks Q and Q’ 
In Case 2, consider a change in Q and Q' : 
3
100
to 
3
95
. According to the threshold values 
set, this change should not issue an alarm. On making the changes and running the simulation on 
SimuLink and checking for a cyber attack, the following key observations are made, 
  3002.20106.06484.10259.00336.01167.19_max_ diffang  (4.5) 
 

















110011
101111
101001
000111
000000
 
 
(4.6) 
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
















4
5
3
3
0
 . 
 
(4.7) 
The algorithm does not produce any false dismissal. Similarly, there are no false alarms too. To 
indicate that a cyber attack is detected when there is a change of over 5%, consider changes in 
blocks Q and Q’:  
3
100
to 
3
9.94
. The following observations are made, 
 3416.20108.06807.10264.00343.05227.19_max_ diffang  (4.8) 

















110011
101111
101001
111111
000000
 
 
(4.9) 

















4
5
3
6
0
 . 
 
(4.10) 
The row sum vector,  , indicates that there is a cyber attack in the system. This indicates that a 
cyber attack on Q and Q’ is never dismissed as a normal condition. 
4.6 Case 3 – Change in R Block 
In Case 3, consider a change in R : 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
42.0
042.0
s
. This is a +5% change in the block 
and should not trigger an alarm. The matrices obtained on running the algorithm are, 
 49 
 
  0075.00122.00882.00812.00908.00968.0_max_ diffang  (4.11) 
 

















010110
101110
101111
010110
000000
 
 
(4.12) 
 

















3
4
5
3
0
 . 
 
(4.13) 
Below a change of +5% in block R, an alarm is not issued. A negative change in the block is 
checked too. It appears that the algorithm does not indicate a cyber attack up to a -5% change in 
the block. It means that there are no false alarms for changes in R in the test bed. 
 On the other hand, if the change is over 5%, the automated energy management system 
should issue an alarm. Such a case is simulated and the output of the algorithm is observed, change 
in R : 
04.0
04.0
s
to 
379.0
0379.0
s
. The algorithm produces the following results, 
  0075.00128.00924.00851.00952.01015.0_max_ diffang  (4.14) 
 

















010110
101110
111111
010110
000000
 
 
(4.15) 
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
















3
4
6
3
0
 . 
 
(4.16) 
This is an indication that there are no false dismissals.  
4.7 Case 4 – Change in S Block 
In Case 4, consider a change in S : 
10
10
s
 to 
51.10
51.10
s
. This is a change of 5.1% to block 
S. Since the threshold values are from changes of 5%, this change should trigger an alarm. Simu-
lation is run after the change is made to the system in SimuLink.  
  0041.00145.00142.00146.00001.01501.0_max_ diffang  (4.17) 
 

















010000
111111
010001
010000
000000
 
 
(4.18) 
 

















1
6
2
1
0
 . 
 
(4.19) 
This is an indication that a cyber attack is detected by the algorithm. On running more tests, it 
could be observed that there are no false dismissals. Similarly, if a block change of -5% was sim-
ulated, the following is observed, 
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  0044.00159.00156.00160.00001.01591.0_max_ diffang  (4.20) 
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(4.22) 
The row sum vector indicates a cyber attack when there is not one. This is a false alarm. On running 
more tests it could be concluded that a false alarm is issued for changes in the range 
%5%64.4  S . There are no false dismissals. 
4.8 Case 5 – Change in Block T 
In Case 5, consider a change in T : 
3011
)03.0)(30(
2  ss
 to 
51.2811
)03.0)(51.28(
2  ss
. When the specified 
change occurs, the automated energy management system operator should see it as a normal con-
dition, since the change is less than 5%. In this particular example, the 5% change is manifested 
as 50.2830  in the numerator and 50.2830  change in the trailing denominator term. In this 
particular test, the indicated change is less than 5%, and thus the parameter 28.51 is used (repre-
senting a change of 4.966%). The change is simulated in SimuLink and the algorithm responds in 
the following way, 
  9922.10067.00128.20334.00330.04388.18_max_ diffang  (4.23) 
 52 
 
 

















111111
101111
101001
001101
000000
 
 
(4.24) 
 

















6
5
3
3
0
 . 
 
(4.25) 
This is another case of false alarm issued. On running more cases it is observed that there are no 
false dismissals and false alarms issued for changes in the range %5%8.4  T . 
4.9 Summary of Cases of false alarms and false dismissals 
From the tests conducted, it can be concluded that there are a few cases of false alarms, 
although there are no false dismissals. Changes in block P, in particular, produce too many false 
alarms. Although this is not a good thing, the DLMP price signal is the signal that could be ac-
cessed the easiest. This means that a false alarm produced due to an acceptable change in the input 
DLMP signal could be detected easily on inspection and the system could be taken off a state of 
cyber attack. This is a conservative design – i.e., no false dismissals, but there may be false alarms. 
The algorithm performance detecting cyber attack in the test bed is summarized in Table (4.2). 
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Table (4.2) Performance of Algorithm for Cyber Attacks in Various Locations in a Noisy Case 
Case  
number 
Type of change in  
system 
False alarm False  
dismissal 
Case 1 Change in P  
(base case 0.15 $/kWh) 
25.01806.0  P  None 
 
Case 2 
Change in Q and Q’ :
3
)1(100 Q
 
Base case 0Q  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 3 
Change in R: 
)1(04.0
)1(04.0
Rs
R


 
Base case 0R  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 4 
Change in S :
)1(10
)1(10
Ss
S


 
Base case 0S  
 
%5%64.4  S  
 
None 
 
Case 5 
Change in T :
)1(3011
)1)(03.0)(30(
2 Tss
T


 
Base case 0T  
 
%5%8.4  T  
 
None 
 
4.10 Comparison with an Existing Method of Cyber Attack Detection 
One of the algorithms developed proposes using an online data validation framework, 
which verifies that the measurements from the home energy meters match with the measurements 
obtained from various verification points in the system (feeder level, subsystem level, customer 
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level) [26]. Though this method was proved to work fine in most of the cases, a few types of 
cybertampering could be missed by the online validation method.  
The method adopted in [26] is explained briefly. The check for cyber attack is done at 
different levels in a feeder-to-user manner. First, the availability and integrity of the FRTUs is 
checked at the feeder level. This is achieved by analyzing the log information recorded by the 
FRTUs. An FRTU is deemed unreliable if malfunction events are observed from its log infor-
mation. The next step of validation is done at the subsystem level. Power flow is performed and a 
mismatch ratio, which indicates the level of inconsistency of metering data, is defined for each 
subsystem. The subsystems that have a mismatch ratio higher than a set threshold level are deter-
mined to be affected by cyber attacks. Once the faulty subsystem(s) is(are) identified, a pattern 
recognition method is adopted to detect the customers that have been sending out faulty data. 
The advantages of the algorithm developed in this thesis over the method adopted in [26] 
are explained in detail: 
 In [26], while performing the power flow analysis at the subsystem level, a cyber 
attack is detected only when the mismatch ratio exceeds a particular value. This 
means that a cyber attack is issued when the overall power consumed by the cus-
tomers in the subsystem (obtained from the home energy meters) differs from the 
power consumption measured at the subsystem FRTU. This type of a detection 
leaves out cases where the consumption of various customers are tampered with, 
keeping the overall consumption same. 
For example, assume a case where there are two customers A and B in the same 
subsystem. If customer A tampers with the energy meter reading and reduces it by 
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an amount , and in turn increases the energy meter reading of B by , a cyber 
attack is not detected. This is a case of what has already been defined as false dis-
missal. 
 In [26], there could be possibilities of errors between actual power losses and esti-
mated losses while calculating the mismatch ratio for the subsystems. This is be-
cause of the difference in the sampling frequency of data for the FRTU and home 
energy meters. If the estimated power losses are far off from the actual values, it 
could lead to incorrect mismatch ratio and potentially a false dismissal. 
The advantage with the algorithm developed in this thesis is that there are no false dismissals. A 
cyber attack is always detected.  
Though there are a few advantages of using the algorithm implemented in this work over 
the method adopted in [26], there is a disadvantage of using the same too. The disadvantage is that 
signals have to be obtained from various sections in a system. This requires many sensors and data 
communication devices. Another disadvantage is the need for large memory storage devices stor-
ing the data collected from the sensors at regular intervals of time. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to develop an algorithm to detect cyber attacks in a distribution 
energy management system. Each component and element in a single customer distribution system 
is designed and built using transfer function blocks, in the s-domain. Four main elements of the 
energy management system are represented by linear transfer functions. If other transfer functions 
are used in an actual energy management system, it is believed that those transfer functions could 
be substituted. The data used in the transfer functions are taken as representative of the energy 
management used in the FREEDM system. The entire concept is based on the architecture of the 
FREEDM system. 
 Signals from various points in the system are taken to obtain the frequency response of the 
transfer functions between the respective sets of points in the system. A base case is simulated and 
the phase angles are stored. The objective is to detect a cyber attack by studying the phase angle 
curves of the transfer functions at regular intervals. A threshold is set on the permissible amount 
of change in phase angle values of each transfer function compared to the base case values. This 
threshold is set by obtaining the maximum phase angle differences seen on simulating 5% changes 
in various blocks in the system. If the differences are higher than the set threshold, a cyber attack 
is said to be detected and an alarm is issued. This algorithm is explained in detail in Chapter 2. 
The algorithm is tested on a noise free test bed in Chapter 3 and a noisy test bed in Chapter 4. 
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Note that a change in excess of 5% in any of the blocks should be considered as “detectable 
cyber attacks” and any change below that should be considered normal. The value “5%” is an 
arbitrary value. A reasonably conservative limit is set on the permissible change in the blocks. 
Otherwise, the constantly varying nature of the input DLMP pricing signal could cause numerous 
cases of false alarms.  
It can be concluded from the results of the tests conducted to test the algorithm in a noise 
free case that the algorithm is efficient and there are very few cases of false alarms and no false 
dismissals. The important observations from the tests conducted are described in Table 5.1.  
Table (5.1) Results of Noise-free Test Cases 
Case  
number 
Type of change in  
system 
False alarm False  
dismissal 
Case 1 Change in P  
(base case 0.15 $/kWh) 
25.02286.0  P  None 
 
Case 2 
Change in Q and Q’ :
3
)1(100 Q
 
Base case 0Q  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 3 
Change in R: 
)1(04.0
)1(04.0
Rs
R


 
Base case 0R  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 4 
Change in S :
)1(10
)1(10
Ss
S


 
Base case 0S  
 
%5%5.4  S  
 
None 
 
Case 5 
Change in T :
)1(3011
)1)(03.0)(30(
2 Tss
T


 
Base case 0T  
 
%5%83.4  T  
 
None 
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Similar tests are conducted for the noisy case, where the input pricing signal has a noise 
component. The noise component is represented by a random number generation block. This is a 
closer representation of the real time DLMP signal. The output of the tests are similar to that of 
the noise free cases. There are no cases of false dismissals, although there are cases of false alarms. 
It could be noted that the number of false alarms is high due to changes in the DLMP price input. 
The important features are concluded in Table 5.2. 
Table (5.2) Results of Noisy Test Cases 
Case  
number 
Type of change in  
system 
False alarm False  
dismissal 
Case 1 Change in P  
(base case 0.15 $/kWh) 
25.01806.0  P  None 
 
Case 2 
Change in Q and Q’ :
3
)1(100 Q
 
Base case 0Q  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 3 
Change in R: 
)1(04.0
)1(04.0
Rs
R


 
Base case 0R  
 
None 
 
None 
 
Case 4 
Change in S :
)1(10
)1(10
Ss
S


 
Base case 0S  
 
%5%64.4  S  
 
None 
 
Case 5 
Change in T :
)1(3011
)1)(03.0)(30(
2 Tss
T


 
Base case 0T  
 
%5%8.4  T  
 
None 
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A main conclusion of this work is that detection of changes in phase angle of digitally (on-
line) calculated transfer functions of components of an energy management system is a valid 
method to detect cyber attacks. 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
 Future work remains for improvement and analysis of the developed cyber attack detection 
algorithm, including: 
 implementation on different test beds, perhaps actual commercially implemented 
energy management systems 
 use a real time DLMP signal as the input pricing signal (e.g., obtained from con-
temporary data in place at one of the Independent System Operators in the United 
States) 
 an improvement of the approximation of customer price-demand relation by stud-
ying load profiles 
 development of a method to reduce the number of false alarms. 
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APPENDIX 
MATLAB CODE USED FOR ANALYSIS OF THE TEST BED 
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A.1 INITIAL BASE CASE CALCULATION 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     BASE_CASE     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Time of which the simulation is run in SimuLink 
n = 200; 
% Time step used 
T = 0.01; 
% Finding the sampling frequency 
Fs = 1/T; 
% Finding the total number of signal values 
L = n*Fs; 
% Finding the mid point so that the second half of the fourier 
transfer can 
% be ignored 
h = L/2+1; 
% Generating the frequency array corresponding to which the 
phase angles will 
% have to be plotted 
f = Fs/2*linspace(0,1,h); 
% Converting the frequency from Hertz to radian per second 
f = f*2*pi; 
% Finding the phase plots of the transfer functions between dif-
ferent sets of 
% points in the test bed 
[initial_ang1] = phase_angle_calc (c,a); 
[initial_ang2] = phase_angle_calc (c,r); 
[initial_ang3] = phase_angle_calc (c,b); 
[initial_ang4] = phase_angle_calc (c,d); 
[initial_ang5] = phase_angle_calc (r,b); 
[initial_ang6] = phase_angle_calc (e,d); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     PHASE_ANGLE_CALC     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Function used to obtain the phase angle plots of the base case 
of the 
% system  
% ang - phase angle plot between 'input' and 'output' 
% input - input signal array 
% output - output signal array 
function [ang] = phase_angle_calc (input,output) 
% Setting the ending frequency of 20 rad/s 
final = 650; 
% Finding the Fast Fourier Transform of the input signal 
fft_inp = fft(input); 
 67 
 
% Finding the Fast Fourier Transform of the output signal 
fft_out = fft(output); 
% Obtaining the transfer function frequency response. This is an 
array of 
% complex numbers 
tf = fft_out./fft_inp; 
% Obtaining the phase angle plot of the transfer function repre-
sented by 'tf' 
ang(1:final) = angle(tf(1:final))*180/pi; 
% Converting angles in the range 160 - 180 to -180 - -200 
for i = 1:final 
    if ang(i) > 160 
        ang(i) = ang(i) - 360; 
    end 
end 
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A.2 SYSTEM EVALUATION AND CHECK FOR CYBER ATTACK 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     MAIN_CASE     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Time of which the simulation is run in SimuLink 
n = 200; 
% Time step used 
T = 0.01; 
% Finding the sampling frequency 
Fs = 1/T; 
% Finding the total number of signal values 
L = n*Fs; 
% Finding the mid point so that the second half of the fourier 
transfer can 
% be ignored 
h = L/2+1; 
% Generating the frequency array corresponding to which the 
phase angles will 
% have to be plotted 
f = Fs/2*linspace(0,1,h); 
% Converting the frequency from Hertz to radian per second 
f = f*2*pi; 
% Finding the maximum phase angle differences and the frequen-
cies at which 
% they occur for each of the six transfer functions 
[max_diff1,frequency1] = phase_comparison (c,a,initial_ang1,f); 
[max_diff2,frequency2] = phase_comparison (c,r,initial_ang2,f); 
[max_diff3,frequency3] = phase_comparison (c,b,initial_ang3,f); 
[max_diff4,frequency4] = phase_comparison (c,d,initial_ang4,f); 
[max_diff5,frequency5] = phase_comparison (r,b,initial_ang5,f); 
[max_diff6,frequency6] = phase_comparison (e,d,initial_ang6,f); 
% Forming an array with maximum phase angle differences observed 
in all six 
% different transfer functions 
max_difference = [max_diff1 max_diff2 max_diff3 max_diff4 
max_diff5 max_diff6]; 
% Forming array containing the frequencies at which the maximum 
phase angle 
% differences occur in each of the six transfer functions 
frequency = [frequency1 frequency2 frequency3 frequency4 fre-
quency5 frequency6]; 
% Initializing the flag matrix 
flag = zeros(5,6); 
% Modifying the flag matrix depending on the tolerance matrix 
and the maximum 
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% phase angle difference array 
for i = 1:5 
    for j = 1:6 
        if max_difference(j) > tolerance(i,j) 
            flag(i,j) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
end 
% Forming the row sum matrix that finally depicts if there is a 
cyber attack 
% in the system or not 
row_sum = flag*[1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1]; 
% Displaying if a cyber attack is detected 
for i = 1:5 
    if row_sum(i,1) == 6 
        fprintf('CYBER ATTACK DETECTED!!\n'); 
    end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     PHASE_COMPARISON     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Function used to obtain the maximum phase angle differences 
between the  
% phase angle plots of the transfer functions in the current 
system condition  
% and the base system phase angle plots 
% max_difference - Maximum phase angle difference between the 
phase angle  
%                  plots of the transfer functions in the base 
case and the  
%                  current case 
% frequency - Frequency at which the maximum phase angle differ-
ence occurs 
% input - input signal array 
% output - output signal array 
% initial_ang - phase angle plot of the transfer functions in 
the base case 
% f - Frequency array 
function [max_difference,frequency] = phase_comparison (in-
put,output,initial_ang,f) 
% Starting frequency of 2 rad/s 
initial = 65; 
% Ending frequency of 20 rad/s 
final = 650; 
% Finding the Fast Fourier Transform of the input signal 
fft_inp = fft(input); 
 70 
 
% Finding the Fast Fourier Transform of the output signal 
fft_out = fft(output); 
% Obtaining the transfer function frequency response. This is an 
array of 
% complex numbers 
tf = fft_out./fft_inp; 
% Obtaining the phase angle plot of the transfer function repre-
sented by 'tf' 
ang = angle(tf)*180/pi; 
% Converting angles in the range 160 - 180 to -180 - -200 
for i = 1:final 
    if ang(i) > 160 
        ang(i) = ang(i) - 360; 
    end 
end 
% Finding the phase angle differences at frequencies 2 rad/s to 
20 rad/s 
for i = initial:final 
    difference(i) = abs(ang(i) - initial_ang(i)); 
end 
% Rejecting phase angle differences of over 20 degrees 
for i = initial+1:final 
    if difference(i) > 20 
        difference(i) = difference(i-1); 
    end 
end 
% Finding the maximum phase angle difference in the frequency 
range of  
% 2 rad/s to 20 rad/s. Also finding the frequency at which this 
maximum 
% phase angle difference occurs. 
[max_difference,index] = max(difference); 
frequency = f(index); 
